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The Consumer Product Safety Act:
Bold New Approaches to Regulatory Theory
Accidents, many of them involving hazardous products, take the lives
of 100,000 Americans each year and injure 52 million more.' Concern has been expressed that the consumer cannot adequately protect
himself from dangerous products. Twenty-one years ago, in his dissenting opinion in Dalehite v. United States,2 a case under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, Mr. Justice Jackson said:
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food
and drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets.
These no longer are natural or simple products but complex ones
whose composition and qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society must exact greater care than in more simple days and
must require from manufacturers or producers increased integrity
and caution as the only protection of its safety and well-being.
Purchasers cannot try out drugs to determine whether they kill
or cure. Consumers cannot test the youngster's cowboy suit or
the wife's sweater to see if they are apt to burst into fatal flames.
Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot experiment with the combustibility of goods in transit. Where experiment or research is necessary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, the product must not be tried out on the public, nor must the public be
knowledge to
expected to possess the facilities or the technical
3
learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers.
Private testing groups such as Underwriters' Laboratories, Good
Housekeeping Guarantee Seal, Consumers Union, and United States of
American Standards Institute ostensibly exist to test product safety.
Yet the effectiveness of these groups is hindered by their functioning
1. Johnson, The Future of Consumer Protection, 23 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 608,

609 (1968). The Consumer Product Safety Commission estimates that 30,000 people
each year are killed and 20 million are injured by products within its jurisdiction. Wall
Street Journal, October 1, 1973, at 5, col. 1-2.
2. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
3. Id. at 51-52.

447

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 447

as agents of industry. This precludes the private testing groups from
meaningfully monitoring the safety of products and policing industry.
The characteristics of Underwriters' Laboratories are typical of the
other private testing groups. Underwriters' Laboratories each year tests
20,000 new products, retests 150,000 products, and distributes 1.1
billion seals which attach to 800,000 different products.4 While the
Underwriters' Laboratories seal enjoys public approval, this is the only
true sanction that Underwriters' Laboratories is able to employ. As
the President of Underwriters' Laboratories admitted on a taped television special, its contract with the companies makes it a private tester
without the power to disclose test results to the public.5 A vivid example of the results of such an arrangement is the use of polyerthane
as uncovered building insulation. When tested by Underwriters' Laboratories using the Bunsen burner test6 and with the polyerthane in
a horizontal position, the polyerthane was self-extinguishing. Not until
much later did Underwriters' Laboratories perform the test with the
polyerthane in a vertical position. Placed vertically, as it is applied
7
in building construction, the polyerthane burns fiercely.
As early as 1969 Underwriters' Laboratories warned the plastics industry of the fire hazards of polyerthane. However, Underwriters' Laboratories did not make a public disclosure nor disclose its findings to
the government. The plastics industry continued until this year to advertise polyerthane as fire retardant and self-extinguishing even after
home fires took the lives of occupants trapped inside by the smoke
and fumes of the burning polyerthane. 8
Monitoring the safety of products requires the ability to evaluate the
degree of safety. Underwriters' Laboratories suffers, as do the other
private testing groups, from the disadvantage of not grading the degree
of safety of a product.9 Products either pass or fail. There is no
mechanism to tell the consumer by how much a product passed or how
miserably a product failed the test.
Further increasing the ineffectiveness of private testing groups is the
4.

Dickerson, Report on Product Safety: Household Goods, 43 IND. L.J. 186, 281

(1968) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson].
5. ABC Special Closeup Fire aired Monday, November 26, 1973 [hereinafter
cited as Fire].
6. In this test a Bunsen burner is placed in close proximity to the material to

be tested and is ignited.
rapidly it bums.

The material is watched to see if it burns and, if so, how

7.

Fire, supra note 5.

8.
9.

Id.
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 282.
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massive power which has passed into corporate hands. James S.
Turner, Consultant to the Center for Study of Responsive Law, writes:
First, massive economic power has passed into the control of
major corporations which are routinely exercising de facto government power. Second, scientific and technological expertise has
been harnessed to this corporate power in a way that makes the
ability to predict hazards lag behind the ability to create new products. Third, the combination of these two factors has led to the
development of a major technological tragedy which is threatening
the quality of human life, if not life itself. 10
With the move of enormous power to the private corporate sector and
with the responsibility for the use of that power undefined, forces are
released which victimize individuals as routinely as they advance corporate power. Central to the task of creating safe products are the problems of dealing with corporate forces and defining corporate responsibility. Technology and science have been harnessed to the needs of
corporations rather than to the needs of individuals."I
The Consumer Product Safety Act passed by Congress on October
27, 1972, is an attempt to fill the gap between corporate power and
the unprotected consumer. This piece of legislation did not come into
existence free of opposition. Pressure from interest groups almost kept
the bill from emerging out of committee. Some of the conferees staged
a "talkathon" with only days left before the adjournment of the NinetySecond Congress, which seemed to spell disaster. The Nixon Administration was determinedly opposed to an independent Consumer Product
Safety Commission and preferred placing the responsibilities for the
Act's enforcement into the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. However, a bipartisan congressional determination that an independent regulatory commission was necessary saved the bill from being
killed. 12

In finally passing the Consumer Product Safety Act, Congress found
that:
(1) an unacceptable number of consumer products which present unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce;
(2) complexities of consumer products and the diverse nature
and abilities of consumers using them frequently result in an inability
10.

Turner, Corporate Responsibility and Product Safety, 8

SAN DIEGO

L. REV. 15

(1971) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
11. Id. at 19.
12. Speech by Congressman John E. Moss before the Consumer Product Safety
Conference, in San Francisco, California, June 4, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Moss] in
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 255, 258 (Practising Law Institute Handbook 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Handbook].
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of users to anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves adequately;
(3)
the public should be protected against unreasonable risks
of injury associated with consumer products;
(4) control by State and local governments of unreasonable
risks of injury associated with consumer products is inadequate
and may be burdensome to manufacturers;
(5) existing Federal authority to protect consumers from
exposure to consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of
injury is inadequate; and
(6) regulation of consumer products the distribution or use
of which affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to
carry out this Act. 13
This article will take an overview of the Act and then discuss the
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System, the prerulemaking provisions, the rulemaking procedures, the enforcement provisions of the
Act, and the new approaches to regulatory theory which this Act
adopts.
PARAMETERS OF THE ACT

Congress declared the purposes of the Act to be: to protect the public
against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products;
to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer
products; to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products
and to minimize conflicting State and local regulations; and to promote
research and investigation into the causes and prevention of productrelated deaths, illnesses, and injuries.' 4
The Act defines a consumer product as "any article, or component
part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for
use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence,
a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or
temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation or otherwise."" However, the Act excludes from coverage tobacco and tobacco products, motor vehicles and equipment, firearms, aircraft,
boats, drugs, devices or cosmetics, food, and economic poisons as defined by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.'6
13.
14.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2051(a) (Supp. 1972).
Consumer Product Safety Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2051(b) (Supp. 1972).

15.

§ 3(a)(1).

The Administration's definition only dealt with sales to a con-

sumer, which would have excluded from coverage such things as synthetic turf, architectural glass and electrical house wiring. Remarks by Michael R. Lemov on Novem-

ber 27, 1972, Handbook, supra note 12, at 9, 12.
16. Consumer Product Safety Act § 3(a)(1)(B)-(I), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a)(1)
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The functions of HEW under the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act and the Poison Prevention Act of 1970 and the Federal Trade
Commission functions under the Flammable Fabrics Act are transferred
to the Commission. 7 Section 31 provides that the Commission has
no authority to regulate any risk if such risk could be eliminated or
reduced to a sufficient extent by actions taken under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or
the Clean Air Act. Nor does the Commission have authority to regulate
any risk associated with electronic product radiation emitted from an
electronic product if it is subject to regulation under the appropriate
provisions of the Public Health Service Act. Requiring the Commission to operate under several different procedural schemes presents unnecessary problems of product classification and necessitates shifting
from one procedural system to another.
NEISS
Section 5(a)( 1 ) requires -that the Commission maintain an Injury Information Clearinghouse to collect, investigate, analyze and disseminate
injury data and information. The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS-pronounced "nice") daily collects and tabulates
injury information gathered from one hundred nineteen hospitals across
the nation. These hospitals represent a cross section of geographic
areas and emergency room use.'
NEISS became operational on July 1, 1972, under the authority of
the Food and Drug Administration's former Bureau of Product Safety.
The system was -transferred to -the CPS Commission on May 14,
1973.19
The NEISS data reporting system begins when an individual enters
a hospital emergency room connected with NEISS. A hospital staff
member identifies all cases connected with consumer products and
translates those cases into numerical codes, identifying age, sex, affected body part, treatment given, disposition of the case, and what consumer product was involved.2" This information is rated and weighted
for frequency, severity, and age of victim.2 The data collected at the
(B)-(I) (Supp. 1972). These items are regulated by other federal agencies or legislation.
17. Consumer Product Safety Act § 30, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2079 (Supp. 1972).
18. Consumer Product Hazard Index, CPSC News Briefing, Item 5 (Sept. 28,
1973) [hereinafter cited as Item 5].
19. Consumer Product Hazard Index, CPSC News Briefing, Item 1 (Sept. 28,
1973) [hereinafter cited as Item 1].
20. Item 5, supra note 18, at 1.
21. Item 1, supra note 19, at 2-4.
By design, children under ten are counted
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hospital emergency rooms is transmitted by computer to Washington,
D.C. where it is reviewed by the Commission staff.22
The coded data tells only that a product was associated with an inInvestigatory data from selected
jury; it does not tell how or why."
cases is obtained to show how the product was involved and the series
of events which resulted in injury, and is used to determine how to
begin corrective action. The surveillance data is used to assist in de24
veloping the product hazard index.
Reports submitted through NEISS include only those injuries receiving emergency room treatment, which are estimated to be only thirtyeight per cent of all product-related injuries. 25 Not currently reported
are those injuries treated in doctors' offices (41%), at home (18%),
and by direct hospital admissions (3%)." The Commission may in
the future add data from death certificates and doctors' office visits
as a means to improve the sources of injury information.27
The Commission would also like to extend NEISS to include the
following information about products on the hazard index: 2 8 number
of products in use, frequency of product use, medical costs of recuperation, cost of lost man-hours of work and recreation, cost of trauma
and mental anguish, additional cost of a product due to meeting a safety
standard or regulation, probabilities of whether a standard will successfully eliminate a hazard, and extent of loss of consumer choice when
products for which risks are voluntarily assumed by users are elimi29
nated.
Another problem centers around the confidentiality of the patient's
name on which an investigative report is done. 30 Confidentiality may
prompt people to cooperate with the in-depth investigations to help
prevent similar accidents from happening to others. However, this may
prove a hindrance to plaintiffs' attorneys using the information gathered by the Clearinghouse and to the Commission itself. Edwin Weidtwice.

The Commission feels that children are especially vulnerable and therefore

safety hazards directly affecting them should be tackled first. Counting their injuries
twice is one method of tracking those hazards uniquely affecting children.
22. Item 5, supra note 18, at 2.
23. Id.
24. Item 1, supra note 19, at 2.
25. 2 NISS NEWS, Sept. 1973, No. 1, at 8.
26. Id.
27. Item 1, supra note 19, at 5.
28. The hazard index ranks consumer products according to the degree of risk of
injury associated with the product as determined from NEISS data. Item 1, supra note

19.
29.
30.
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Item 1, supra note 19, at 1.
Consumer Product Safety Act § 25(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2074(c)

(Supp. 1972).

1974

Consumer Product Safety Act

man, writing in the Trial Lawyers Quarterly, said:
A review of the public disclosure sections of the Consumer Product
Safety Act leads to the conclusion that the Consumer Product Safety
Commission will have little difficulty in finding statutory authority
to limit the information available to the plaintiffs' Bar to innocuous statistical data and technical information disconnnected from
real people, real products, and human events.8 1
However, the purpose of the Act is not to help plaintiffs prove their
cases, 32 but to promulgate safety standards. Even so, it was not the
33
intent of Congress that the dissemination of information be so limited.
The confidentiality requirement is potentially troublesome to the
Commission itself. The Act provides that standards may be developed
if the Commission finds that they are "reasonably necessary to prevent
or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product." 4 The injury data gathered by NEISS is of the "associated with
a product" type and thus will suffice to justify proceedings to develop
standards. But before the Commission can issue a standard it must
find "that the rule is reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an
unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product. 3' 5 In a court
challenge, the issue would become whether there is a sufficient causal
link between the elements of the product modified by the standard and
the injuries associated with the product. The Commission might have
a difficult time proving causation with confidential evidence that cannot
be checked for credibility. The solution to this problem may lie in
securing as many waivers from patients as possible to allow release of
statistically viable data.
PRERULEMAKING PROVISIONS-SECTIONS

7

AND 8

Sections 7 and 8 set prerulemaking requirements for product standards and bans respectively. The proceedings under section 7 are commenced by publication in the Federal Register of a notice which identi31. Weidman, Consumer Product Safety Act: Will It Yield Products Liability Information?, 9 TRIAL LAWYERS QUARTERLY 55, 57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Weidman].
32. Plaintiffs' Bar does have available the American Trial Lawyers Association
Products Liability Information Exchange. The Exchange came into existence in 1956
and enables a cooperating attorney to find the name of an attorney who had an earlier
similar case, the name of his client and the nature of the injury. Weidman, supra
note 31, at 56.
33. For discussion of disclosure of information, see text accompanying note 83
infra.

34.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 7(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(a) (Supp. 1972)

(emphasis added).

35.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 9(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2058(c)(2)(A)

(Supp. 1972) (emphasis added).
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fies the product and the risk associated with the product, states that
a safety standard is necessary, includes information on any existing
standards, and invites any person to submit an existing standard as a
safety standard or to offer to develop the proposed standard. 6
The Commission is then directed to accept one or more offers if the
offeror is technically competent, will likely develop an appropriate standard, and will comply with the Commission regulations. 7 "Technically competent" and "likely develop an appropriate standard" are terms
that will require further definition or interpretation by the Commission
and courts. Section 7(d)(3) requires the Commission to set regulations whereby the offeror supports its recommendations with test data
and other documents; provides for notice and opportunity for interested
persons to participate in the development process; maintains records,
available to the public, disclosing the course of development, any comments submitted by any person, and any other relevant matter; and
opens its pertinent books for audit and examination.
Sections 7(a) (1) and (2) actually provide for the promulgation of
three different types of product standards. Quality standards specify
a particular design or kind of material to be used, e.g., building or
electrical codes. Performance standards prescribe the manner in which
the product must perform, thus leaving to each manufacturer the
method to be used to comply, e.g., standards regarding burning characteristics of children's sleepwear. Identity standards require a manufacturer to place certain warnings and/or instructions on his products,"
e.g., baby cribs must be tagged for two years with a label stating that
the crib meets applicable CPSC regulations. 9
Section 7(e) (2) (B) prohibits the Commission from developing a
proposed standard once an offer to develop has been accepted unless
the Commission determines that no offeror is making satisfactory progress in developing such a standard. This prohibition on Commission
standard development should not, however, be equated with a prohibition against acquiring the technical capabilities necessary to evaluate
40
properly the standards recommended to the Commission.
Some of the inadequacies of private testing groups are met by sec36. Consumer Product Safety Act § 7(b)(1)-(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(b)(I)-(4)
(Supp. 1972).
37. Consumer Product Safety Act § 7(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(d)(1) (Supp.
1972).
38. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 279.
39. CPSC Requires Crib Labeling, CPSC News Release (Dec. 28, 1973).
40. Remarks of Michael R. Lemov on November 27, 1972, Handbook, supra note
12, at 9,19.
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tions 7(d) and (e). The Commission is authorized to accept one or
more offers to develop a proposed safety standard and, in its discretion, may contribute to the offeror's cost."' The Commission also
is to prescribe regulations governing the development process and maintenance of records. To the extent that these procedures place a buffer
between the manufacturers and the laboratories doing the testing, the
agency functions to prevent industry from dominating the testing laboratories. However, section 7(e)(2) may defeat these benefits. It provides that "in any case in which the sole offeror whose offer is accepted. . . is the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of a consumer
product proposed to be regulated by the consumer product safety standard, the Commission may independently proceed to develop proposals
for such standard during the development period" (emphasis added).
This savings clause could be defeated should a trade association or
combination of manufacturers, distributors or retailers make the offer
which is accepted since "manufacturer," "distributor," and "retailer"
are defined terms which do not include such combinations. 2
The real issue is: What is the purpose of section 7(e)(2); was it
meant to protect consumers from businessmen, or to protect businessmen from their competitors? Both versions find support in the legislative history. The House bill would have barred the Commission from
developing a proposal once it had accepted a private offer." The Senate bill contained the Nelson amendment which precluded a manufacturer, developer or retailer (or employee of such) of a consumer product from offering to develop a standard with respect to that product."4
The conference bill compromised by allowing industry to develop
standards but allowing the Commission to proceed on its own when
industry does so. One might conclude that this was a limited response
to the problem of lax, self-serving industry-developed standards. In
this case, section 7(e)(2) should apply to an offer from a group or
association of self-interested persons no less than to an offer from a
single manufacturer, distributor or retailer with an economic stake in
41.

Offerors are expected to contribute at least five per cent of the project cost.

However, the Commission could decide to bear the entire cost if the offeror has no

source of non-federal funds.
Development-Encourages
1974).

42.

CPSC Publishes Rules For Mandatory Safety Standard

Consumer

Participation,

CPSC News

Release

(Jan.

4,

Consumer Product Safety Act § 3(a)(4)-(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a)(4)-(6)

(Supp. 1972).
43. H.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(e)(2) (1972).
44. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(e)(1)(C) (1972).
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the outcome.45
Representative Broyhil, a House conferee, during floor debate, offered a different explanation for the conference compromise:
The conference version retains a very limited portion of the Nelson amendment providing that in the very limited situation
wherein a manufacturer of a product is the one and only offeror
in a bid to create a product standard, the Commission may concurrently investigate and develop a similar standard. Such a provision is justified in that the Commission should have independent
knowledge of -the subject matter where only one outfit is working
up a standard which will apply to its product and similar products
of possible competitors. In all other cases the Commission is
foreclosed from duplicating
the work of offerors to avoid unneces46
sary double expense.
The exception to the prohibition of Commission standard development
is never applicable when two or more offers are accepted, even though
the accepted offers all come from interested companies. Thus both
the danger of self-serving standards, which benefit the industry as a
whole, and the danger that the standards might favor the particular
developers over their competitors still remain.4
At least it is within
the Commission's power to avoid these dangers, since there is no compulsion to accept more than one qualified offer.
Section 7(d)(2) allows the Commission to contribute to the cost
of developing a proposed standard. Congress intended this provision
to enable consumer organizations and other groups without economic
resources to play a role in the development process.4 8 There are currently several consumer groups capable of expanding their staffs to take
49
advantage of this opportunity.
The contribution to cost provision may mitigate the loss felt when
the consumer advocate proposal was eliminated from the original bill.
Unless the Commission feels a commitment to contribute to offerors'
costs or separate consumer-advocate agency legislation is passed, 50 it
is likely that the opportunities "offered by this legislation will (like most
45. Scalia and Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act,
20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 899, 914 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scalia and Goodman].
46. 118 CONG. REC. H 9909 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972), cited in Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 950 n.190.
47. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 914.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972).
49. See discussion of private testing groups in the introduction of this article.
50. The issue is not yet closed, since legislation to establish a federal consumer
advocate to appear before other agencies is now pending in both Houses of Congress.
See S. 707, S. 1160, H.R. 14, H.R. 21, H.R. 564, H.R. 762, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1973).
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procedural opportunities) be grasped principally by those groups that
are sufficiently cohesive and have enough at stake to warrant the legal
costs-in a word, by commercial rather than consumer interests."'"
A major issue of procedural policy that the Commission must face
is the importance it wishes to assign the section 7 prerulemaking process. The Commission may choose to rely upon the selection of an
appropriate developer and upon specification of regulations under section 7(d)(3) to assure proposals which could ordinarily be adopted
without considerable agency work. Or the Commission may plan, instead, to devote its own resources to standard development and use
section 7 to place useful outside suggestions before its staff.
Beyond the prerulemaking powers of section 7, the Commission may
ban hazardous products under section 8 if it finds that a consumer product presents an unreasonable risk of injury and no feasible consumer
product safety standard would adequately protect the public. 52 Several practical differences between banning a product and promulgating
a standard exist. The first difference is that a ban can kill an entire
product industry, whereas a standard allows the industry to solve the
problem through technological innovation. The second difference is
that only a standard subjects manufacturers and private labelers to the
certification, testing, and labeling requirements of the Act.5 3 "In some
situations, then, businessmen might prefer a complete ban of a subproduct to a safety standard applicable to the broader product cate' 54
gory.
A third difference is that only a ban can be applied to products manufactured before its effective date. However, this difference is de
minimis since under section 12 the Commission can in serious cases,
without issuing a ban, seek a judicial declaration that previously manufactured products are imminent hazards. Also, under section 9(d)(2)
the Commission may prohibit the stockpiling5 5 of any product to
which a consumer product safety rule applies, so as to prevent its manufacturer from circumventing the purpose of the consumer product safety
51. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 952.
52. The Commission may also reach the same result by completing the prerulemaking procedures of § 7. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 916.
53. Consumer Product Safety Act § 14, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2063 (Supp. 1972).
54. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 917.
55. Stockpiling is defined as manufacturing or importing a product between the date
of promulgation of such consumer product safety rule and its effective date, at a rate
which is significantly greater than the rate at which such product was produced or imported during a base period ending before the date of promulgation of the consumer
product safety rule. Consumer Product Safety Act § 9(d) (2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2058(d)
(2) (Supp. 1972).
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rule. Finally, only a standard prevents states from adopting more stringent requirements."' Section 26(a) prevents states from enacting or
continuing in force any standard dealing with the same risk as the federal standard unless it is identical with the federal standard.
A question which arises is what criteria should be used to determine
when a ban should be imposed and when a standard should be promulgated. One suggestion is to ban only those products within a generally recognized consumer goods category which are interchangeable
for the same specific consumer use.17 For example, baby rattles with
inedible contents would not be subject to a ban, but rather to a standard, i.e., all baby rattles must have edible contents, because the "product" is all baby rattles. That is, there is neither a generally accepted
58
category of, nor a specific use for, rattles with poisonous contents.
RULEMAKING PROVISIONS-SECTION

9

The rulemaking process is set forth in section 9. Within sixty days
after publishing a proposed standard, the Commission must either promulgate a standard, or rule that such a standard is not necessary."
The product safety rule must identify the risk of injury that the rule
is designed to eliminate or reduce.6 0 The more specifically the risk
of injury is spelled out, the easier it will be to challenge," since
the Commission must show causation. The more generally the risk
is set forth in the rule, the more likely it is that it will preclude deskable state action, since the risk description controls the federal preemption provision of section 26(a). 2
Once a standard is passed it applies only to consumer goods manufactured after its effective date. 63 The drafters of the Act anticipated
that this might lead to stockpiling of the product before the effective
date. To prevent this, section 9(d)(2) allows the Commission to prohibit such stockpiling. Basically, the Commission can forbid the manufacture or importation of the product concerned at a rate which is faster
than before the standard was imminent. Unfortunately, stockpiling is
allowed unless the Commission affirmatively acts to prohibit it.
56. Consumer Product Safety Act § 26, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2075 (Supp. 1972).
57. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 920.
58. Id.
59. Consumer Product Safety Act § 9(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2058(a)(1) (Supp.
1972).
60. Consumer Product Safety Act § 9(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2058(b) (Supp. 1972).
61. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 925.
62. Id. For discussion of the federal preemption provisions, see text accompanying
note 56 supra.
63. Consumer Product Safety Act § 9(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2058(d)(1) (Supp.
1972).
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Amendment or revocation of a standard, unless it involves an immaterial change, is to be handled under the same procedures used to promulgate a standard in the first instance and is subject to judicial review
under section 11 in the same manner as a standard.
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

Under section 12, consumer products which present an imminent
and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness or severe personal injury may be seized by the Commission's filing an action in any United
States district court within the jurisdiction of which such consumer
product is found.64
When a consumer product presents a substantial product hazard, the
Commission can, under section 15, order the manufacturer or any distributor or retailer of the product to do one or more of the following:
(1) give public notice of the defect or failure to comply; (2) mail
notice to each person who is a manufacturer, distributor or retailer
of such product; or (3) mail notice to every person to whom the person required to give notice knows such product was delivered or
sold.65 The Commission, if it finds it to be in the public interest,
may order the manufacturer or any distributor or retailer to take whichever of the following actions the person to whom the order is directed
elects: (1) bring the product into conformity with applicable standards or repair the defect of such product; (2) replace the product;
or (3) refund the purchase price. 66
A section 12 seizure has the advantage of speed, control of the judicial proceeding, and broader scope of product coverage. Since a section 12 proceeding begins in the courts without a preliminary agency
stage before enforcement can be obtained, it expedites Commission action. A section 12 action does not require Justice Department approval
as does an action to enforce a section 15 order.6" Since sections 15
and 22 can only be applied to products that are in violation of a rule
or, with respect to section 15, contain a "product defect," a product
which is neither banned nor in violation of a standard, but which is
inherently unsafe rather than "defective," e.g., firecrackers, may be
reachable only through section 12.68
64. Consumer Product Safety Act § 12, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2061 (Supp. 1972).
65. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(c) (Supp. 1972).
66. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(d) (Supp. 1972).
67. See Consumer Product Safety Act H9 27(b)(7) and 12(f), 15 U.S.C.A. §
2076(b)(7) and 2061(f) (Supp. 1972).
68. Scalia, Imminent Hazards and Substantial Product Hazards, HANDBOOK 51, 55
(1973).
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Section 15, which provides for notification and repair, replacement
or refund, has two advantages for the Commission. The first advantage is that the Commission makes the initial determination that a product presents a hazard, with only limited review in the courts. The
second advantage is that the standard of "substantial product hazard"
is easier to prove than is section 12's "imminent and unreasonable risk"
69
standard.
Prohibited acts are outlined in section 19. It is unlawful to (1) manufacture, sell, distribute or import any consumer product which does
not meet applicable standards or which has been declared a banned
hazardous product; (2) fail or refuse to allow access to or copying of
records, make reports, or permit entry or inspection; (3) fail to furnish
information regarding defective products or fail to comply with a notification or repair, replacement and refund order; (4) fail to furnish
or furnish a false or misleading certificate specifying applicable safety
standards and certifying compliance; and (5) fail to comply with any
rule relating to stockpiling.
Formal sanctions against unlawful behavior are set forth in sections
20 through 25 of the Act. These include civil and criminal penalties,
injunctive enforcement and seizure, suits for damages by persons injured, private enforcement, and continuation of common law rights and
duties.
The civil penalties only apply to knowing70 violations. Each violation (each offensive consumer product constitutes a separate violation)
is subject to a $2,000 penalty with a $500,000 maximum for any related series of violations. 71 Each day of a continuing violation equals
a separate offense. However, the Commission in determining the
amount of the civil penalty will consider the size of the business and
the gravity of the offense. While it may be desirable to allow the Commission to take these factors into consideration in order to afford the
Commission flexibility, at the same time it dulls the real teeth of
the civil penalties provision.
The criminal penalty section requires a knowing and willful violation
69. Id.
70. Knowing is defined as "knew" or "ought to have known." Consumer Product
Safety Act § 20(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2069(c) (Supp. 1972).
71. Excepted from the "each product equals a separate violation" rule are those persons who violated § 19(a)(1) or (2) and who are not the manufacturers or private
labelers or distributors of the products involved and who did not have either actual
knowledge of the violation or notice from the Commission that such sale or distribution

would be a violation.
(a)(2) (Supp. 1972).
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after having received notice of non-compliance from the Commission.
This provision not only suffers because criminal intent will be difficult
of proof in such cases, but this section shifts to the Commission the
burden of informing the person or corporation of its violation. Thus,
so long as violations remain clandestine and the Commission serves no
notice, the violator faces no criminal penalties. This section provides
for an individual director, officer or agent of a corporation to face criminal sanctions along with the corporation.
Injunctive enforcement and seizure is provided for by section 22.
Either the Commission or the Attorney General may bring such an action in a United States district court for a district wherein the violation
occurred or where the defendant is found or transacts business. Process may be served on a defendant in any other district in which the
defendant resides or may be found. This section may prove to be the
most effective in stopping violations and preventing harm to the consumer, since the real goal is to get the offensive products off the market.
While an injunction may be of little deterrent value in keeping others
from committing similar offenses, it at least removes from the market
those products which are presently hazardous and in non-compliance.
Suits for damages by persons injured 2 under the Act require a
knowing and willful violation. This remedy is in addition to and not
in lieu of any other remedies at common law or under federal or state
law. 3 In order to obtain jurisdiction in a federal court, the injury
sustained must be $10,000 or more, but diversity of citizenship is not
needed. 74 In addition to damages the court may award suit costs,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.7 5 This section may not be very
significant because of the jurisdictional amount limitation. However,
it does afford access to the federal courts which might not otherwise
exist.
It has been argued that "as standards are adopted by the new Commission it may well prove to be extremely difficult to recover damages
in those cases where the defendant can establish compliance with a standard adopted by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. ' '7 6 Section 25 blunts this argument. Subsection (a) specifically states that:
"Compliance with consumer product safety rules or other rules or
72.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 23, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (Supp. 1972).

73.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 23(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2072(b)

74.
75.

76.

(Supp. 1972).

Consumer Product Safety Act § 23(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a) (Supp. 1972).
Id.

Elking, Safety Act: For the Bar; Some Advantages, No Free Rider, 9

(July/August 1973) 43.
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orders under this Act shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person." Evidence
of compliance is, however, admissible and, if experience with the Flam77
mable Fabrics Act is reliable, this will discourage personal injury suits.
One would hope that the standards promulgated will be such that compliance will drastically reduce the existence of injuries in the first place
and thus reduce the need for such suits.
Further, section 25(b) provides that the failure of the Commission
to act shall not be admissible in evidence in litigation at common law
or under state statutory law relating to the consumer product involved
in the litigation. The content of this section is unusual in that it states
a rule of evidence. Generally rules of evidence and procedure are governed by state law. It might, therefore, be possible for a state judge
to ignore section 25(b).
Several authors believe that the private suit is the most effective sanction. It has been pointed out that "[t]he deterrent power of a jury verdict under our fault system is a priceless public benefit,"' ,, and that
"[f]aced with the possibility of high damage awards, heavy litigation
expenses, and extensive unfavorable publicity-in addition to possible
administrative action-the unscrupulous businessman may feel that a
79
shift to unobjectionable techniques would be more profitable.
Two other sections indirectly provide the Commission with sanctions to be used against violators. Section 6 allows for public disclosure
of violations and section 15 allows the Commission to order manufacturers, distributors and retailers of substantially hazardous products
themselves to make public disclosure. Thus, the Commission has the
added tool of adverse publicity to force compliance.
NEW

APPROACHES TO REGULATORY THEORY

The Consumer Product Safety Act incorporates five major innovative
ideas in regulatory theory: increased public participation; the use of
the private attorney general concept; independence from presidential
control; detailed judicial oversight; and the placing of affirmative duties
on industry.
77. Id.
78. Kelner, The Fault System, The Courts and The Consumer Revolt, 8 SAN
L. REv. 75, 81 (1971).

DiEGo

79. Comment, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts. The Judicial
Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413, 438

(1972) [hereinafter cited as Private Remedies].
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IncreasedPublic Participation
Several provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Act attempt to
assure that the public will have an opportunity to influence the administrative process. It has been pointed out -that:
The rulemaking process [of federal agencies in general] has frequently been criticized on the ground that the agency's real decision-making occurs in the formulation of the proposed rule, which
is done without public participation, and the subsequent public
proceeding to establish the final rule is often an empty show in
which parties vainly try to reverse judgments already made. 0
The section 7 prerulemaking process provides a means of avoiding
agency precommitment to privately developed proposed rules, but precommitment is avoided only if the proposals are not intensively evaluated until the section 9 rulemaking stage. 81 If the Commission does
its major evaluation of proposed standards developed under section 7
before the rulemaking process of section 9 is substantially completed,
then the pitfall of agency precommitment can hardly be avoided. On
the other hand, some prior evaluation will be necessary to insure that
the section 9 rulemaking procedures will not be wasted because they
are addressed to a proposal substantially different from that which the
Commission ultimately wishes to adopt.8 2
The Commission must prescribe regulations governing the development of proposed standards by offerors under section 7(d) (3) (B)
which will provide interested persons, including representatives of consumers and consumer organizations, with notice and opportunity to participate in the development of such standards. Thus the Act itself
insures the public a chance to participate in the development process.
Further, section 9(a)(2) requires that the Commission give interested persons an opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views,
or arguments as well as an opportunity to make written submissions.
These presentations will of course only be effective if the agency is not
already precommitted. Nevertheless, oral presentation should help consumers overcome the hindrances which arise from their lack of organization and funding.
In addition to giving the public broader participation rights in the
administrative process, the Act affords the public broad access to
agency information. Section 5(a)(1) says, "The Commission shall
80. Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 909.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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maintain an Injury Information Clearinghouse to collect, investigate,
analyze, and disseminate injury data, and information, relating to the
causes and prevention of death, injury and illness associated with consumer products" (emphasis added). In explaining this section, Senator Moss said, "I am hopeful -that the new independent regulatory
agency will take appropriate steps to assure the public access to consumer safety information so as to prevent injury -and make consumer
participation in agency proceedings meaningful." '
PrivateAttorney General
Any interested person may, under section 24, bring a suit for private
enforcement of a product safety rule or for enforcement of an order
that notification of a substantial product hazard be given under section
15. This section thus allows a private citizen or organization to act
in the role of the attorney general. The section, though, requires that
notice be given not less than thirty days prior to commencement of
such action to the Commission, to the Attorney General, and to the
person against whom such action is directed. Section 24 also gives
the plaintiff the opportunity to elect in his complaint to recover reasonable attorney's fees. If the plaintiff so elects, the court must award
the costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party. The defendant is not afforded such an election. Since the plaintiff alone can make a demand for attorney's fees, whether the suit is
brought for valid cause or merely for harassment, the plaintiff can make
this section work to his advantage.
By not granting exclusive enforcement power to a governmental
agency, the Act may stimulate consumer organizations to aid in protecting the public.14 On the other hand, section 24 contains the potential
for consumer misuse of the private attorney general enforcement provision to harass an industry or company. Even more likely is the possibility that manufacturers or distributors will misuse section 24 to force
their competitors out of business.8 5
Independence from PresidentialControl
Several out-of-the-ordinary provisions insulate the agency from presidential control. The first such provision is section 4(a), which permits
83.

Remarks by Senator Moss on October 14, 1972 in
142 (1972).
Private Remedies, supra note 79, at 418.
Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 949.
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84.
85.
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the presidentially appointed chairman to serve in that capacity until the
expiration of his term of office as commissioner."6 This provision is
a departure from the practice in the other independent regulatory agencies, where the designee's tenure as chairman (though not as commissioner) is ordinarily at the pleasure of the President.
Another deviation is section 4(d), which reserves to the five Commission members the right to elect a vice-chairman annually. Normally
for those agencies that have a statutory vice-chairman, it is provided
that he also is appointed by the President. 7
The usual statutory grounds for removal of a commissioner from
office by the President are inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.88 However, the Consumer Product Safety Act permits removal only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, and for no
other cause.8 9 Omission of "inefficiency" as cause is a concrete expression of the importance Congress attached to protecting the Commission's independence.9 0 This may not have an obvious effect since
even under the broader standard no member of an independent regulatory commission has been removed by the President since 1935. 91
Regardless of the removal standard, the White House may use the
presidential position to gain resignations. Therefore, the stricter
standard is likely to insulate the commissioners from presidential control, if at all, only in an opaque manner.
Another effort to insure the agency's independence is found in section 27(k)(2), which states: "No officer or agency of the United
States shall have any authority to require the Commission to submit
its legislative recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation . . . for approval, comments, or review."
Further, section
27(k)(1) provides that whenever the agency submits any budget
estimate or request to the President or the Office of Management and
86. Also noteworthy is § 4(c), which places restrictions on the commissioners as
to political party affiliation, employment or ownership in concerns which are affected

by the CPSA, and § 4(g)(2), which prohibits key agency employees from taking jobs

in regulated industries for one year after employment with the Commission. The latter
section speaks to the problem of agencies serving as corporate executive training
grounds. Remarks of Congressman Bob Eckhardt, in Washington, D.C. on November
27, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Eckhardt], HANDBOOK 275, 282 (1973).
87. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-4( a )(1970) (Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 49 U.S.C. §
1654(j) (1970) (National Traffic Safety Board).
88. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1970) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 15 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1970) (Federal Trade Commission).

89.

90.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2053(a) (Supp. 1972).
Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 904.

91. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See also Wiener
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), involving the War Claims Commission.
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Budget, it shall concurrently transmit a copy to Congress. These provisions will help the agency avoid the following problem faced by other
agencies in the past:
Certain officials of the Administration have apparently attempted to control the decisions of federal agencies operating in the
field of consumer protection and environmental quality through a
process of preclearance of standards through the Office of Management and Budget. Certain federal agencies were required to
submit an advance schedule showing estimated dates of all proposed and final regulations, standards, and guidelines, the name
of the agency official responsible for the activity, and the proposed
regulations, standards, and guidelines in advance of their announcement to the public.9 2
The Consumer Product Safety Commission is structured so as not to
come within the ambit of such a requirement.
Detailed JudicialOversight
The Consumer Product Safety Act, in section 11, allows for judicial review of any Commission rule, instigated by any person adversely
affected or by any consumer or consumer organization. However, the
petition must be filed in the appropriate United States court of appeals
not later than sixty days after a consumer product safety rule is promulgated by the Commission. This time limitation could present obstacles
to unorganized groups, which do not maintain close contact with the
Commission's actions. When judicial review is sought, section 11(c)
gives the court the authority to grant any appropriate relief, including
interim relief.
In section 10 the Act allows any interested person, including a consumer or consumer organization, to petition the Commission to commence a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or revocation of a
consumer product safety rule. While the right to petition is not an
unusual provision in administrative acts, it is unusual that the consumer
93
is afforded judicial review if the Commission denies the petition.
With the assurance of court review, private initiation of agency action
can become a very valuable instrument for effecting public good. The
only hindrance would be lack of organization on the part of consumers.
It may well turn out that industry, because it is organized and funded,
will be the most frequent user and principal beneficiary of reaction
of section 10, since industry can use that section to secure amendment
92.
93.
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or revocation of standards unfavorable to it.94
Affirmative Duties Placed on Industry
Sections 13 through 16 are significant because they place upon industry affirmative duties which are not found in other independent regulatory agency legislation.9" Under section 13 the Commission can
prescribe procedures by which a manufacturer shall furnish notice and
a description of new products to the Commission.9 6 This section
affords the Commission the opportunity to anticipate problems and
avoid the situation where a standard is proposed only after injuries and
deaths have occurred.
Section 14 mandates product certification and labeling by each
manufacturer that his products conform to applicable regulations. The
certificate must accompany the product, specifying any standard which
is applicable, stating the name of the manufacturer or private labeler
issuing the certificate, and stating the date and place of manufacture.
The certificate must be 'based upon a test of each product or upon a
reasonable testing program. 97
Section 15(b) imposes upon manufacturers, distributors and retailers
the duty of informing the Commission of failures to comply with standards and of defects in products, when the manufacturer, distributor
or retailer obtains information which reasonably supports the conclusion
that such a failure or defect exists.
Effective March 21, 1974, 8 manufacturers, importers, distributors
and retailers must notify the Commission within twenty-four hours
of obtaining such information.9 9 The initial notification must identify
the product, give the name and address of the manufacturer, if known,
give the names and addresses of every distributor and retailer, if known,
specify the nature and extent of the defect or failure to comply with
an applicable safety standard, and provide the name and address of
the person informing the Commission. 1°° Within forty-eight hours
94.

Id.

95. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1970) (Hazardous Substances); 15 U.S.C. §§
1191-1204 (1970) (Flammable Fabrics Act).
96. Consumer Product Safety Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2062(a) (Supp. 1972).
97. Consumer Product Safety Act § 14(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2063(a)(1) (Supp.
1972).
98. The regulations were proposed August 3, 1973, and have been informally followed since then. There have been 82 defect notices in that time, involving more than
12 million individual products. CPSC Issues Regulations For Reporting Product Defect, CPSC Press Release (Feb. 20, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Press Release].
99. 39 Fed. Reg. 6061 (1974).
100. Press Release, supra note 98, at 3.
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the following additional information must be reported, if available: the
manner in which information conerning the hazard was obtained;
copies of any consumer complaints about the hazard; the number, nature and severity of any associated injuries; the number of units involved; how remaining inventory will be disposed of; and any identifying marks or numbers on the potentially hazardous units.' 0 ' Failure to
notify the Commission is only excused when the manufacturer, distributor or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has been
adequately informed of such defect or failure to comply.
Section 16 places upon manufacturers, distributors and retailers the
duty to maintain records as required by the Commission and to allow
reasonable inspections of any factory, warehouse or establishment in
which consumer products are manufactured or held, or any conveyance
being used to transport consumer products.
CONCLUSION

The Consumer Product Safety Act has strengths and weaknesses.
Increased public participation in the entire administrative process, the
use of the private attorney general concept, independence from presidential control, detailed judicial review, and the placing of affirmative
duties on industry strengthen the Act. The success of the Act may
depend on the extent to which these new approaches fulfill their intended purposes.
Certainly, one area that needs revision is the requirement that the
Commission exercise those product safety functions transferred from
existing agencies only in accordance with procedures established by
prior legislation. This requirement presents unnecessary questions of
product classification and compels a shift from one procedural scheme
to another, 0 2 without offering countervailing benefits.
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt whether the Act will be vigorously enforced. The Act itself authorized 55 million dollars for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.03 The Administration only asked
for 30.9 million dollars to operate the Consumer Product Safety
Agency; thus the Commission took a forty-four per cent cut, before
it ever got started. 0
Some writers believe that "the government still
shows little stomach for all-out control measures to protect the Ameri101.

Id.

102.
103.

Scalia and Goodman, supra note 45, at 952.
Consumer Product Safety Act § 32(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2081(a)(1)

1972).
104.
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can consumer."1" 5 The Commission has only been in existence since
May, 1973, and is already being criticized for not acting with enough
dispatch.' 0 6 For instance, the ABC Closeup Fire noted that so far
the non-flammability standards for children's sleepwear only apply to
sizes 0 through 6x (about five years old) and, further, that two-thirds
of the fires involving children occur while children are in daytime clothing. However, even if it is the case that the Commission does not act
quickly or decisively, Congress has afforded the people the opportunity
under this Act to require action and to enforce the regulations.'
Therefore, if action is not vigorous enough it will be to some extent
the consumer's fault.
Yet safety always comes down to money. The human costs are set
against the economic costs. The cost of product-related injuries is estimated at some 5.5 billion dollars per year. 08 This figure includes
medical expenses, loss of income, and decreased production and consuming power. 10 9 On the other side of the ledger, there are at least
three factors to be considered. The first is the increased price the consumer might have to pay, since safer products generally cost more to
make and market. The second factor to be considered is the loss in
utility that may accompany an increase in safety. For example, in the
case of fabrics used in sleepwear, fire retardancy generally entails a
loss of comfort and durability of the garment. The third consideration
is the restriction on the freedom of consumer choice which may result
from increasingly higher degrees of safety." 0 It is of no small consequence that at last society has the means to make the choice between
human and economic costs, since it was obvious that the "free market"
chose to ignore the human costs.
WENDY LEE GOULD
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Turner, supra note 10, at 76.
Fire, supra note 5.

Consumer Product Safety Act § 10 (allowing any interested person to petition

for a consumer product safety rule) and § 24 (private enforcement of product safety
rules), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2059, 2073 (Supp. 1972).
108. Moss, Handbook, supra note 12, at 269.
109. Id.
110. Bakke, Product Safety, 28 BUSINESS LAwYER 289, 315 (1973).
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